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EDITORIAL NOTE

As a unique publication genre in EMR, translation articles
communicate the experiences and outcomes that
engaged management scholars have while translating
their scholarship into practice. Adrian Wolfberg and
Nancy M. Dixon’s article “Learning through Dialogue
During Intelligence Assessments: A Translation of Theory
into Practice” adopts a novel retrospective approach
to the translation genre. They translate a theory about
learning types in intelligence assessments published by
the first author (2014-2017) to empirical evaluations
of intelligence assessment practices that the authors
developed prior (2010-2013) to publication of the
theory. The purpose of intelligence assessments is to
make a judgement about a threat or opportunity that an
organization faces and to communicate the judgment
in oral or written form with supplemental material to
decision makers. In these practices, intelligence analysts
interact not only with the target decision makers, but
importantly with peer analysts and intelligence managers
across the organizational hierarchy. As such, intelligence
assessments are complex practices with high standards
for producing accurate and reliable information and
with several opportunities to interact and learn from
others. Against that backdrop, the considered theory
suggests four types of learning involved in intelligence
assessments. The paper zooms in on the role of dialogue
within each of these types of learning and applies it
to the historical, empirical evaluations of intelligence
assessment practices. This translation advances the
theory and provides practical insights into how dialogue
with peers and managers can help intelligence analysts
produce and deliver accurate and reliable information
to decision makers. In addition, the authors reflect
on their retrospective translation experience with
recommendations for other engaged management
scholars. As such, I highly recommend reading Wolfberg
and Dixon’s article to learn about the fascinating practice
of intelligence assessment and as inspiration for
advancing the translation paper genre in EMR.

Learning Through Dialogue
During Intelligence Assessments:
A Translation of Theory Into
Practice
Adrian Wolfberg
Defense Intelligence Agency

Nancy M. Dixon
Common Knowledge Associates

ABSTRACT
We translate a theory into the practice of intelligence assessments.
Following Karl Weick’s (1993) retrospective approach, the translation
relies on previously published evaluations of intelligence assessment
practices. Intelligence assessments are used in organizations to inform leaders of threats and opportunities. The theory we apply describes how an intelligence analyst learns through dialogue during the
practice of conducting an intelligence assessment, and it consists of
four learning archetypes: cooperative, focused, survival, and reflective.
The theory is based on the differential effects on learning caused by
the interaction between information overload and equivocality. We use
the role of dialogue in the theory as a way to compare two different
practice contexts: national security and law enforcement. We offer
three contributions: First, we find that the final stage of the practice—
the review process—should occur organizationally where authoring
analysts and their senior analyst reviewers reside. Second, we find
that equivocality has differential effects on dialogue: In low equivocality conditions (cooperative and focused learning), hierarchical structures
affect dialogue; and in high equivocality conditions (survival and reflective learning), organizational politics affect dialogue. Third, we identify
a benefit of and a challenge in retrospective translation studies.

Lars Mathiassen
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INTRODUCTION
Organizations use knowledge-based
intelligence assessments to protect
themselves from surprises and to take
advantage of opportunities in an uncertain environment. In national security,
law enforcement, and public safety organizations, decision-makers depend on
analysts to produce intelligence assessments. In the for-profit sector, analysts
produce intelligence assessments to
alert decision-makers about technological developments in, for example, the
pharmaceutical, chemical, biotechnology,
nanotechnology, aerospace, materials,
and electronic industries. In the non-profit
sector, intelligence assessments are produced in higher education, public governance, museums, foundations, and public
research centers. Organizations often fail
to protect themselves or to leverage opportunities because decision-makers do
not integrate the knowledge they receive
in such assessments.
Decisions based on these assessments
set precedents and affect an organization’s success or failure (Eisenhardt &
Zbaracki, 1992). However, learning from
those who provide knowledge that can
protect organizations from threats and
alert them to opportunities is not solely
the responsibility of the decision-maker.
We assert that those who provide knowledge to be learned during their interaction
with a decision-maker also bear responsibility. Dialogue is an important way in
which this learning can occur. Dialogue
is an effort to build a common ground by
asking what we really mean or what the
other individual really means to elicit our
own and the other’s assumptions (Schein,
1993). Dialogue is a way of determining
whether perceptions and interpretations
are correct in an effort to uncover hidden
premises (Argyris, 1990). Therefore, we
suggest that understanding how an intelligence analyst learns through dialogue

during an intelligence assessment process
is a worthwhile pursuit that can benefit
scholars and practitioners alike.
We proceed in the following manner. First,
we introduce the translation approach and
its components. Second, we describe each
of the components in detail: the theory
of learning and the role of dialogue; the
practice of intelligence assessments; and
the historical documentation of practice.
Third, we conduct the translation analysis and discuss what we learned from the
translation of theory, including reflections
on the translation approach we used.
Translation Approach
This translation consists of three elements: a theory, a practice, and historical
documentation. We adapt John R. Austin’s
(2013) translation approach, inspired by
Karl Weick (1993), by reversing the order
of translation. Instead of creating a theory
and then applying it to practice, we examine historical documentation of a practice
and then apply a particular theory to analyze it.

subsequent five-year period, both authors
collaborated on evaluating the practice.
The first author also developed the theory used in this paper, including the role of
dialogue. The theory focuses on how an
intelligence analyst learns during knowledge transfer with a decision maker. It was
developed from a practice within a law enforcement intelligence context. The second author, a former university professor,
has written about organizational learning
and dialogue.
For the historical documentation used in
the study, we turned to evaluations of the
practice (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010; Nolan,
2013; Wolfberg & Dixon, 2011). These
historical evaluations primarily focused
on the final step of the practice—the “review process,” as the step is called—in a
national security intelligence context. The
national security and law enforcement intelligence contexts are very different, but
the practice of intelligence assessments is
the same for both (Carter, 2012).1

We have relevant experience in all three
elements of the translation. The practice
of the intelligence assessment is a multistep process. The notional steps for intelligence analysts include clarifying the task,
searching for and collecting information
relevant to the task, thinking about the
information collected, preparing a draft
narrative, and undertaking a series of interactions using oral and written dialogue
between peer analysts, as well as with
individuals who review and edit the draft
assessment. For the practice element, the
first author spent more than fifteen years
writing intelligence assessments for both
national security and law enforcement
agencies and another five years reviewing and editing other intelligence analysts’
assessments in the same contexts. In a

	National security intelligence seeks to protect U.S. territory and its people from threats that originate from foreign countries, while law enforcement
intelligence seeks to stop criminal behavior within the United States (Carter, 2012). For law enforcement, the constitutional protections of privacy, civil
liberties, and civil rights dominate the very fabric of its support to criminal procedures, while these constitutional protections are an infrequent constraint
to national security intelligence (Carter, 2012).

1
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TRANSLATION ELEMENTS
Theory
National security scholars point to information overload and equivocality as
detrimental to the practice of producing
intelligence assessments and to analysts’
ability to learn (Fingar, 2011). Consequently, the first author’s research considered
the influences that information overload
and equivocality had on intelligence analysts as they produce an intelligence assessment. The research culminated in a
theory suggesting that intelligence analysts’ learning occurs in one of four broad
archetypes: cooperative learning, focused
learning, survival learning, and reflective
learning. Each archetype, described below,
is influenced by varying degrees of low or
high overload and equivocality (see Figure
1, cells 1, 2, 3, and 4).
The theory considers the use of various interaction mechanisms by intelligence analysts during the practice, highlighting how
their use or absence can either improve or
thwart learning. One common interaction
mechanism is dialogue, which has a role
that is then different for each learning
archetype (Wolfberg 2014, 2015, 2017).
Although dialogue is used in each archetype, it does not produce equally effective
results for intelligence analysts across the
Figure 1: Learning Archetypes

different archetypes. Intelligence analysts
can effectively use dialogue in low equivocality conditions (i.e., cooperative and focused learning), whereas they cannot use
it effectively in high equivocality conditions (i.e., survival and reflective learning)
(Wolfberg, 2014, 2015). The differences
are discussed below in more detail and
summarized in Table 1.
In cooperative learning (Figure 1, cell 1),
continuous dialogue is the primary mechanism used by intelligence analysts to increase their understanding of the decision
maker’s perspective. This understanding
increases learning by providing analysts
with a big picture of the decision maker’s
worldview. Dialogue is also used to create
an emotional bond with the decision maker, thus generating a feeling of joint ownership and trust in the pursuit of mission
success. As a result of the dialogue, an analyst and a decision maker jointly interpret
and co-discover knowledge by allowing
the decision maker to act as mentor for
the analyst (Lankau & Scandura, 2002).
In focused learning (Figure 1, cell 2),
as-needed dialogue is used successfully
with analyst peers. Intelligence analysts
engage in dialogue with peers who pro-

vide knowledge and perspective outside of
their own expertise. Peer dialogue is used
to increase an intelligence analyst’s store
of knowledge, and it has an indirect and
positive feedback effect of increasing the
decision maker’s trust in, demand for, and
appreciation of the analyst. As a result, analysts achieve a greater and more in-depth
cognitive focus through successful control
of their informational environment.
In survival learning (Figure 1, cell 3), analysts might try as-needed dialogue, but
even if they do so, it often is not successful. Even when overload is somewhat successfully reduced, the confusion inherent
in crises persists or may even increase further because the emphasis on controlling
overload fails to reduce the high level of
equivocality. When analysts are overcome
by the number of tasks or by approaching
deadlines, and also are confused because
of the nature of a crisis, engaging in dialogue with a decision maker makes it hard
for both the analyst and the decision maker to understand one another (Wolfberg,
2015).
In reflective learning (Figure 1, cell 4), analysts sometimes try as-needed dialogue
as a mechanism to access a decision maker’s needs at the time of their assessment
task, but they often are unsuccessful. The
reason is that analysts at this point are absorbed in intense, self-reflective activities,
such as reframing, imagination, and deliberate thinking, and this reflexivity makes
it difficult to establish common ground
through dialogue (Wolfberg, 2014, 2015,
2017). If dialogue with a decision maker
is successful at this point, an intelligence
analyst might be more open to consider
alternative, yet realistic, interpretations of
the data and conclusions and to make the
intelligence assessment more useful to
the decision maker.

Note: Figure 1 is derived from Wolfberg (2014, 2017).
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Table 1: Role of Dialogue Across Learning Archetypes
Learning
Archetype

Description

Role of Dialogue

Cooperative

Mutually beneficial
relationship between
intelligence analysts and
decision makers affords codiscovery of knowledge.

Continuous dialogue with decision
makers increases intelligence analysts’
understanding of a decision maker’s
perspective of a joint effort.

Focused

Control of the environment
allows intelligence analysts
to achieve in-depth cognitive
focus.

As-needed dialogue with peers increases
intelligence analysts’ knowledge, and
decision makers’ trust in, demand for, and
appreciation of the intelligence analyst.

Survival

Methods to reduce disorder
allow intelligence analysts
to apply existing knowledge
quickly.

As-needed dialogue with decision
makers attempts to focus decision
makers’ attention and to improve their
understanding of a chaotic environment.

Reflective

Introspective thinking allows
intelligence analysts to
create new meaning amidst
ambiguity.

As-needed dialogue with decision makers
about relevant operational knowledge
and decision considerations can help
intelligence analysts to interpret data.

Note: Table 1 is derived from Wolfberg (2014, 2017).

Practice
An intelligence assessment is an oral
or written narrative often supplemented with visual information authored by
one or more intelligence analysts. The
purpose of an assessment is to make a
judgment about a threat or opportunity,
to provide interpretations of its effect on
an organization’s interests, and to provide considerations on whether and how
decision makers should act. The final sequential step of the practice—the review
process—is the interaction between the
author and the peers and superiors to finalize the assessment before delivering
it to a decision maker. Depending on the
situation and the organizational context,
this last part of the practice, at its slowest
pace, can take months to complete or, at
its fastest pace, can take a day or less to
complete.

A notional characterization of these practice-based interactions in a hierarchical
organization has vertical and horizontal
components (see Figure 2). The vertical
component always begins with one or
more intelligence analysts who are the
authors of an intelligence assessment.
Authoring analysts typically are located at
the lowest level of the hierarchical organization: the branch.2 Analysts submit their
assessment through a series of transfers
with more senior intelligence analysts,
who make decisions about the assessment and the next step in the review process. In this notional example, we use a
national security context.
The first step in the vertical component
is the delivery of an assessment to a senior intelligence analyst (SIA), who does
not have supervisory responsibilities but
holds informal authority as a decision
maker over the intelligence analyst’s as-

sessment. In the second step, the SIA
submits the assessment to a senior intelligence officer (SIO), located hierarchically
at a more senior level at either the division
or office level. Like the SIA, the SIO also
has no supervisory responsibilities but
does hold informal authority as a decision
maker over the reviews made by SIAs. In
the third step, the SIO submits the assessment to one or more senior defense
intelligence analysts (SDIAs). SDIAs are
the most senior analysts in the office; they
have no supervisory responsibility but
do have informal authority as a decision
maker over the reviews made by SIOs. In
addition, managers at each level—branch,
division, and office—typically are analysts
who have been promoted or hired into the
management track; they have supervisory
responsibilities and formal authority, and
they review but do not write assessments.
The horizontal component includes other analysts who communicate with the
authoring analyst. Sharing occurs among
peer analysts who have knowledge and
interest in the assessment topic, both
within and outside the authoring analyst’s
organization. Peer analysts bring additional knowledge and perspectives relevant to
the assessment that the authoring analysts might need.
Historical Evaluations
We focus our attention on ways of communicating because of the communication
that occurs in the historical evaluations
used in this paper (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010;
Nolan, 2013; Wolfberg & Dixon, 2011). The
second author led a participatory research
project—a study motivated and initiated
by the needs of the analysts—to analyze
the interactions involved in the intelligence assessment practice in a national
security intelligence organization (Dixon &
Wolfberg, 2010). One of their key findings
involved ways of communicating (Schein,
1993) during the final interaction phase of

	The typical structure of the organization includes three levels: the lowest form, the “branch,” which falls within a “division,” which falls within an “office.”
Not all organizations have the same structure. The size of each level varies by organization. Sometimes a branch is further subdivided into one or more
teams, although a branch typically is the lowest form of organization that has a formal management position. An office, at the highest level, could include
more than 100 people. As a result of this variation in structure, the number of people who participate in a review process also varies.

2
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Analysts found that this dialogue created
a team spirit and offered a bigger picture
than what their experience had provided.
One analyst remarked:

Figure 2: Notional Practice-Based Interactions

	I really trust the senior intelligence analyst to guide me as he has worked this
account for decades. If I’m a little off, I
would rather be able to talk about it
(Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010).
Another analyst said:
	Face-to-face reviews are usually better.
My branch senior intelligence analyst
is phenomenal, the best-ever editor.
She’s like a net because she catches
everything. And she will sit down and
talk with the analyst (Dixon & Wolfberg,
2010).
Note: SIA–senior intelligence analyst; SIO–senior intelligence officer; SDIA–senior defense intelligence analyst.

the practice. These findings included the
following:
•	The exclusive use of the written word
in almost all forms of exchanges was
insufficient for conveying feedback on
the robustness of analytic thinking and
expression.
•	Customer feedback lacked the insights
to be informative and to help improve
analysis.
•	The customer feedback given was almost always positive and thus did not
provide the authoring analyst with
feedback leading to correction or improvement (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010).
Nolan (2013) conducted research that
analyzed interpersonal communications
in a national security organization. In this
dissertation, Nolan provides examples of
how information is shared and communicated between intelligence analysts who
work in crisis situations. Wolfberg and
Dixon (2011) conducted a study of how
intelligence analysts reflect on their communications with their managers.
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THEORY TRANSLATION
Translation Analysis
In the following, we translate the theory of
learning through dialogue into intelligence
assessment practices, based primarily
on the previously published report (Dixon
& Wolfberg, 2010) and augmented with
supplemental historical reports (Nolan,
2013; Wolfberg & Dixon, 2011). Table 2
summarizes the results of the translation
analysis.
Cooperative Learning. Cooperative learning was evident, for the most part, in the
practice through the dialogues between
the intelligence analyst and the branch senior intelligence analyst. For example, an
analyst stated:
	If I have a question, we can talk about
it. It is usually pretty straightforward. I
wrote something. He said, “This part is
really good,” and “Put this up front,” and
“This should not be a repeat of the first
paragraph.” I’ll say, “Is this what you’re
looking for?” He sits just two desks
away. I try to take anything as a lesson
and not take it personally because I’m
new to this and this is how I’ll learn to
do it (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010).

The importance of such dialogues is further evidenced by the fact that senior
intelligence analysts are collaborative,
like analysts, but have a deeper content
knowledge than analysts and are more
familiar with the analytic standards with
which the analyst must comply. For example, a branch-level senior analyst said:
	If I retire… as a senior intelligence analyst, I’ll feel I’ve been successful because
I really like this job. Bringing new analysts onboard and getting them excited
about their issues/countries makes me
feel the best. If an analyst can prove me
wrong, I really like it because it shows
they’re interested (Dixon & Wolfberg,
2010).
Senior intelligence officers are task-oriented and assigned numerous additional
responsibilities because of their higher
level positions. One branch-level analyst
compared the senior intelligence officer
and senior intelligence analyst positions
this way:
	The senior intelligence analyst is the
best job in the analytical sphere. You’re
getting your hands dirty, reading traffic/
papers, you can focus on the analysts
themselves every day. Senior intelligence officers can’t do that – they’ve

JANUARY 2021, VOL. 4, NO. 2

Table 2: Translation Results

gence officers in their chain-of-command
during this time:

Learning
Archetype

Evidence of
Dialogue in
Practice

Evidence of Dialogue in Theory

Historic
Account

Cooperative

Analyst gains new
perspectives and
learns.

Authoring intelligence analysts are
in dialogue with branch-level senior
intelligence analyst and manager
within the same agency.

Dixon &
Wolfberg
(2010)

Focused

Analyst’s
knowledge gaps
are filled.

Authoring intelligence analysts are
in dialogue with peer analysts within
and outside the same agency.

Dixon &
Wolfberg
(2010)

Survival

Analyst likely
does not learn.

Authoring intelligence analysts try to
dialogue with decision makers, who
are inundated with other demands in
a fast-paced, chaotic situation.

Nolan (2013)

Reflective

Analyst tries to
inform senior
reviewers.

Authoring intelligence analysts try
to dialogue with senior reviewers at
higher levels of the agency in written
or oral form in the later stages of the
practice.

Dixon &
Wolfberg
(2010),
Wolfberg &
Dixon (2011)

got too much else going on (Dixon &
Wolfberg, 2010).
Focused Learning. Focused learning
through dialogue was evident in the
practice in peer coordination activities.
Analysts found that they gained new
knowledge from peers within their branch,
which allowed them to use their own expertise while also taking advantage of
expertise outside of their domain to fill in
knowledge gaps. An analyst mentioned:
	He [the peer] said, “You mentioned this
guy and then mentioned this guy and
the last names are the same, so you
might want to differentiate these two.”
It’s good to have these guys see it; they
are going to spot stuff that’s not clear. I
sit with these guys every day. It’s not a
matter of beating each other up (Dixon
& Wolfberg, 2010).
This gap-filling knowledge helps analysts
to deliver higher quality knowledge to senior reviewer decision makers, and to improve the decision maker’s appreciation of

the analyst. However, sometimes the peer
review benefit is missing. For example,
one analyst explained that more peer review was desired:
	
We think the most rigorous review
should be from our peers. We get
through it rather quickly, but when
you’re looking at the review process
of the evidence line and traffic, we’ve
hacked out a lot of those issues before
it goes up the chain of command. We
should be doing more peer review – as
least we think so in our division. We
think we should have a longer suspense
at the team level and a shorter one at
the division level – and that is backwards now (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010).
Survival Learning. Evidence of survival learning is found in the attempts at
dialogue included in Nolan’s (2013) description of assessments produced immediately after the terrorist attacks on U.S.
soil on September 11, 2001. One analyst
described the difficulty that analysts had
engaging in dialogue with senior intelli-

	My branch chief has my back, but my
deputy and group chief never have our
backs, consistently throwing us under
the bus. That sort of thing makes a difference when you have to defend your
analytic line and you’re challenged and
have to argue with people much more
senior (Nolan, 2013).
Another intelligence analyst described the
detrimental effects of not knowing everything that is going on but also acknowledged that the possibility of blind spots
increases because the amount of overload
is so great:
	The pace here can be excruciating. Especially since 9/11, I feel like people
are just so worried about overlooking
something or not catching onto a trend,
which we should be. But it’s like, how
are you supposed to know in the moment what’s a trend? So you’re constantly trying to cover your bases, but
you often don’t know. And along with
that, and the need to publish, is the
sense [that] everything is needed now,
now, now. Everything is urgent. I’m always tired because I never get enough
sleep (Nolan, 2013).
Reflective Learning. Attempts at written
dialogue in reflective learning conditions
were apparent in the 2010 evaluation report (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010). After the
team or branch senior intelligence analyst
saw the analyst’s assessment, the form
of knowledge exchange between analyst
and senior intelligence officers primarily
shifted. It went from oral dialogue to written dialogue through the “track changes”
software feature of Microsoft Word, and
this communication was conveyed by
email.3 An analyst lamented about the lack
of in-person, oral dialogue:
	Seldom do I get called in to talk with
them [the high-level reviewers] to dis-

	“Track changes” is an editing feature, embedded in the software application, that shows deletions, changes, and additions to the text; subsequent readers
of the text can then review and retain or reject these changes.

3
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cuss changes they want to make. Most
of the time, there is no discussion about
changes, so you can’t say you disagree.
It comes down as, “you will make these
changes.” Who’s the analyst: me or you?
You may have general area knowledge,
but I’m the one doing the specifics (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010).
For senior intelligence officers, who edit
more assessments than a team or branch
senior intelligence analyst, oral dialogue
with analysts would be time consuming—
hence the rationale for written dialogue.
However, without oral dialogue, the analyst was unable to understand the perspective of the particular reviewer to see
why such a reinterpretation of the data
was needed. An analyst commented:
	The team lead review will be e-mailed,
but we’ll generally sit down and go over
things. At the branch senior intelligence
analyst level, we get a majority of the
changes and comments via e-mail,
with some personal interaction. At the
division level it is primarily email, with
infrequent interaction. Above the division senior intelligence analyst or officer level, all of the review comments are
e-mailed (Dixon & Wolfberg, 2010).
In one example where an attempt at oral
dialogue was made between the authoring analyst and senior intelligence officers,
the attempt was not successful, as indicated in the following discourse (Wolfberg
& Dixon, 2011).
The senior analyst began the dialogue:
	I don’t think you have enough evidence
to go on to make bold statements in a
product. There’s not going to be a peace
agreement tomorrow.
The analyst responded:
	I know there won’t be an agreement tomorrow. I’m just saying this is a unique
situation given the leadership calculations on both sides, and if talks last
long enough, the sides might be able to
achieve peace through attrition.
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In response, the senior intelligence officer
said:
	I’ve seen this before. We should put a
time cap on how long we think these
talks will last. Besides, the conflict usually heats up around this time of year
anyway.
The analyst, defending himself, said:
	All I’m saying is that I think the leadership calculations may have changed.
Talks wouldn’t have even lasted this
long if their intentions weren’t different
now, but maybe I can try to soften the
language in the product so it sounds
less certain.
Although the exchange represents an attempt at oral dialogue, the dialogue was
not successful because the participants
did not share the reasoning behind their
views.

DISCUSSION
We identify three contributions from this
translation study: a practice lesson about
intelligence assessments; an insight into
the theory of learning through dialogue;
and a lesson about the retrospective approach to translation.
Practice Lesson
The practice lesson we learned through
the translation study is that the major
emphasis of a review process used in intelligence assessments should occur at
the lowest organizational level. At this level, dialogue is most effective (see Table 2,
cooperative and focused learning) and can
be leveraged between the authoring analyst and the analyst’s immediate senior
analyst or manager.
As mentioned, the typical model that intelligence and law enforcement agencies
use to review intelligence assessments
focuses the level of accountability and responsibility on the most senior individuals
in the analytic organization (Figure 2). We

take for granted that review processes in
these agencies remain in place, and that
the need for experienced analysts to review the assessments of less experienced
analysts is to be desired. What is needed is
an organizational design that more equitably balances the level of effort from the
top of the hierarchy, where changes and
decisions are made, to the bottom of the
hierarchy, where the authoring analysts
and their branch- or team-level senior analysts can use dialogue to more fully engage in the review process. Such enhanced
engagement can shift the use of dialogue
from the mentoring-like role it plays within the branch- or team-levels to a more
procedure-oriented role. For example, a
procedure-oriented approach to dialogue
might focus on evaluating in depth the
specific standards of analytic quality—for
example, standards related to explicit expression of underlying assumptions and
inferences. The desired outcome is that
cooperative, focused, and reflective learning improves.
Senior analysts at higher levels of the organization still have a role in providing an
additional layer of quality control and advice. We recommend that the leadership in
each analytic office create boundary spanner positions (Carlile, 2004). The boundary
spanner would navigate the processes and
results of the branch- and team-level reviews in their office and negotiate between
these reviewers and the higher level reviewers in their office. The boundary spanner role might be filled for short periods
by senior intelligence analysts, but in their
spanner role, they would be assigned to a
different organizational entity to engage in
the review process between authoring analysts and senior reviewers. These boundary spanners should be selected for their
emotional intelligence and maturity and
should be able to appreciate and translate
between the different worlds of authoring
analysts and senior reviewers.
Theory Insight
The theory insight we gained through the
translation study is that equivocality has
differential effects on dialogue during

JANUARY 2021, VOL. 4, NO. 2

learning. Under low equivocality conditions (cooperative and focused learning),
hierarchical structures appear to influence
the effectiveness of dialogue, and under
high equivocality conditions (survival and
reflective learning), organizational politics
predominantly influence the effectiveness
of dialogue. These differences are summarized in Table 3 and discussed in the
next section.
Low Equivocality Conditions. In cooperative
learning, face-to-face dialogue between
analysts and their branch- or team-level
senior intelligence analyst helped analysts
to learn. Individuals who belong to the
same lower part of a hierarchical organization have much closer, more widespread
and intense relationships than individuals
who are positioned in higher parts of a
hierarchal organization (Simon, 2002). Simon (2002) called this phenomenon near
decomposability. The concept of near decomposability allows for the recognition
that higher degrees of hierarchical separation can negatively affect communication
between individuals (Carlile, 2004). When
interaction occurs across a wide hierarchical separation, then dialogue is not as
helpful because more senior intelligence
analysts are busy with other tasks. Very
senior analysts have a large number of
analysts for whom they are responsible,
which allows them only small increments
of time to devote to any one assessment,
and which also minimizes their opportunity to develop a relationship with the authoring analysts. Hierarchical boundaries
are known to disrupt dialogue, and, without dialogue, people are less likely to know
each other’s needs.

In focused learning, dialogue between authoring analysts and peer analysts is very
helpful because it fills in the knowledge
gaps of the authoring analyst. However, if
the intelligence assessment practice deemphasizes peer review and prioritizes review by higher levels of the organizational
hierarchy, this shift is not viewed as helpful
or desired by authoring analysts. The literature suggests that the more distant the
reviewer is from the knowledge creation,
i.e., from the writer and the writer’s analysis, which transfers data into knowledge,
the more difficult it is for the reviewer to
understand with certainty the data and
inferences that underlie the knowledge.
According to March and Simon (1958), this
“uncertainty absorption” by the reviewer
can thwart dialogue. The authoring intelligence analyst who transforms the data
into knowledge can identify the evidence
used and the inferences made during the
transformation. However, senior reviewers, who are structurally removed from
the cognitive transformation activity of
the authoring analyst, are somewhat limited in their ability to easily and quickly inquire into the accuracy of these inferences
due to uncertainty absorption.
High Equivocality Conditions. In survival
learning, which occurs during a crisis, dialogue between lower and upper levels of
the hierarchy may not even be attempted.
Decision maker agendas and organizational politics at higher echelons of the
hierarchy become problems instead of
learning opportunities for lower echelon
analysts (Wolfberg, 2014). We know from
early experiments that if overload alone
is present, filtering is an effective mecha-

Table 3: Differential Effects on Dialogue
Learning Archetype

Level of Equivocality

Type of Feature

Effect on Dialogue

Cooperative

Low

Structural

Less hierarchical
separation increases
dialogue.

High

Organizational

More politics and
agendas decrease
dialogue.

Focused
Survival
Reflective
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nism to reduce it (Miller, 1960). However,
when both overload and equivocality exist
simultaneously, as they often do in crisis
situations, efforts at clarification through
dialogue largely disappear. This absence
of dialogue can result in an organizational focus on addressing the symptoms of
the problems, rather than on understanding their underlying cause. Argyris (1990)
called this single-loop and double-loop
learning, respectively. Addressing symptoms—single-loop learning—does not
eliminate causes, but if causes are faced—
double-loop learning—then problems are
more likely to be solved.
In reflective learning, authoring analysts
might attempt to engage in dialogue
across hierarchical levels because the analyst is trying to educate higher level senior
intelligence analysts. Analytic management tends to focus on data sources as a
way to detect and reduce mistakes made
by authoring analysts and may deemphasize the value of connections between
and implications of non-obvious people,
events, and relationships (Klein, 2011).
This error-correction behavior is apparent
in the dialogue provided previously in the
translation section. An organizational behavioral routine focused on error-correction creates defensiveness and thwarts
effective dialogue (Argyris, 1990). Defense
mechanisms prevent learning because
they protect the defensive party from exposure to other ideas (Argryis, 1990) that
might suggest an error in his or her analysis.
Retrospective Translation Lesson
Our retrospective application of theory
into historical documentation provides
two lessons. First, this approach affords
theory creators the opportunity to experiment with the translation of theory into
different contexts through a simulation—
that is, by examining the applicability of
a theory to different contexts through a
historical account, without the effort of
an intervention. In applying our theory
of learning through dialogue to historical
documentation, the simulation allowed
us to evaluate the documentation and
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the theory without having to create new
interventions that might have confounded the theory’s implementation; it also
allowed us to avoid common challenges
in such interventions: expending political
capital, overcoming organizational resistance, and fighting for time and resources
to create prescriptions for organizational
change. Second, the approach offers a way
to address the challenge in retrospective
translation that requires the researcher
to find both a practice involving historical
documentation that is common across
different contexts, and a theory covering a common phenomenon by which to
implement the translation simulation. In
our case, the common practice is the intelligence assessment, and the common
phenomenon is the role of dialogue during
learning.
This retrospective translation of theory
across contexts supports the generalizability of the theory of learning through
dialogue in the production of intelligence
assessments. As we reported in Table 2,
the translation successfully used a theory about a practice in law enforcement
and applied it to the same practice from a
different context: that of national security.
Future research might consider another
closely related yet more common management context. The theory of learning
through dialogue also is likely to be generalizable to competitive business intelligence in the for-profit and non-profit
sectors. Competitive intelligence shares
common roots and practices with national security and law enforcement intelligence (Gainor & Bouthillier, 2014). For
this reason, we see promise in the use of
translation research to apply the theory
of learning through dialogue into practice
across a broad spectrum of assessment
contexts.
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